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Introduction
• Realities of Man Rated systems
• Realities of centralized processing
• Criticality independent improvements
• Criticality dependent improvements
• Criticality dependent architecture decisions
• Partitioning by criticality
• Mission critical development option
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High Criticality: Necessary Caution
9 What high criticality means for Space Shuttle
— Human life is dependent on correct operation
• Drives emphasis on quality, reliability, safety
— Controlled, predictable, and repeatable development processes
— Analysis of all software errors for flight safety impact
— Methods open to defect cause analysis
— Development and test tools also treated as critical
— Flight Support requires near immediate response
Corrections or work arounds expected during operational use
• Delivery in hours
• Developed following a stringent process
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Less Critical: Caution & Culture
• Flexibility should be permitted when the consequences of software failure are
non-life threatening
— Expected software quality is consequence driven
• Less costly development methods
• Less costly defect control process
• Less oversight of development processes
— Flight Support levels are consequence driven
• Less extraordinary support requirements
• Recovery more important than immediate understanding of cause
• Corrections by release, not by patch
• Flight Critical culture may require actions which are inconsistent with failure
consequences
— Decades of centralized processing have institutionalized high criticality
thinking
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Choosing COTS Software Trade Candidates
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COTS Decision Guidance
Selecting COTS/MOTS for high criticality functions should require greater technical
insight and stronger risk management planning than for lower criticality functions
High Criticality
Is Certification Plan adequate for criticality?
Will vendor disclose defects found by other users?
Are there adequate measures of quality and reliability?
Will vendor disclose development methods?
Is vendor willing to escrow source code?
Visibility into design and code?
Is Flight Support Plan adequate?
Is technical support plan adequate?
Is the risk management plan for loss of support adequate?
Lower Criticality
Is Certification Plan adequate for criticality?
Will vendor disclose defects found by other users?
Is vendor willing to escrow source code?
Is Flight Support Plan adequate?
Is technical support plan adequate?
Is the risk management plan for loss of support adequate?
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Realities of Centralized Processing
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Criticality Independent Improvements
• Technology modernization enables process improvements independent of
software criticality
- Requirements Definition and Analysis Phase
• On-line requirements and on-line reviews
• Requirements prototyping
- Software Development and Verification Phase
• Visual presentation of design
• Design directly coupled to code
• Modern desk-top development tools
• Automatic path/segment test tools including coverage analysis
• LAN based simulations
• Automatic test report generation
• Potential development cost reduction of -10% for new avionics software
compared to current methods
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Criticality Dependent Changes
• Candidate process changes based on a criticality partitioned system
- V&V testing to vary with criticality of functionality
- Redundant testing coverage (like today) for Criticality 1 software
- Less than full shall & path coverage for lower criticality software
Reduced testing documentation
• Random sampling of V&V test results for NASA review
- Test philosophies to be evaluated with various combinations of V&V testing
and analysis or audit
• Potential development cost reduction of -22% for new avionics software
compared to current methods
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Partitioning by Criticality
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Selecting a Process to Match Criticality
• Sample predicted defects remaining at first flight (per 100K SLOCS)
• SAMPLE DATA - Not final quantitative values
Errors Remaininq
Inserted Errors/KSLOC	 10	 1,000 Errors
Removed in Inspection 65% of Total 350 Errors
Development Test 55% of Remaining 150 Errors
Software Integration Test 	 50% of Remaining	 75 Errors
After V&V Testing
Criticality 1 Test Philosophy	 80% of Remaining 15 Errors
Criticality 2 Test Philosophy 60% of Remaining 30 Errors
Criticality 3 Test Philosophy 40% of Remaining 45 Errors
After Integrated Avionics Verification Testing
Criticality 1 Test Philosophy	 65% of Remaining
	 5 Errors
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Partitioning for criticality limits support costs for new avionics
10/27/99 . ATVIG.ppt	 Page 14	 USA
U it.A Sp­
 All-n
Summary
• Man Rated systems require added caution
• Distributed processing increases the software verification boundaries
• Select COTS with care and take appropriate risk mitigation actions
• Single criticality forces a single process
• Partitioning enables flexibility in process selection
• Appropriate process tailoring necessary to yield required costs and quality
• Criticality partitioning is key to controlling costs
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